require costly commitments to beliefs that violate both core aspects of logical consistency and our intuitive expectations about how the world works, both of which are otherwise crucial for successfully navigating the world (Atran and Norenzayan 2004) . Religious practices are often costly in terms of material 70 sacrifice (ranging from human sacrifice to prayer time), emotional expenditure (inciting fears and hopes), and cognitive effort (maintaining conflicting models about the nature of the world). One anthropological review of religious offerings concludes: "Sacrifice is giving something up at a cost. . . . 'Afford 75 it or not,' the attitude seems to be" (Firth 1963) .
At the same time, the origin of large-scale cooperative human societies is also an evolutionary puzzle because people frequently cooperate and trade with non-relatives in ephemeral interactions (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) . Thus, while the evo-80 lutionary mechanisms associated with kinship, reciprocity, and reputation clearly influence cooperation in important ways, they do not capture the fullest extent of human prosociality. Kinship cannot explain cooperation among non-relatives (Henrich and Henrich 2007) , though "fictive kinship"-a cul-85 tural manipulation of kin psychology-may contribute to mobilizing larger groups (Johnson 1987; Atran 2003) . Reciprocity does not suffice to explain cooperation beyond dense social networks, small villages, or tightly knit neighborhoods (Hruschka and Henrich 2006; Allen-Arave et al. 2008; Atran 90 2010) . Neither direct nor indirect reciprocity can explain cooperation in transient interactions in large populations, because reputational information rapidly degrades as a function of population size, or in large-group interactions such as those associated with many kinds of public goods or common dilemmas 95 (Boyd and Richerson 1988; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003; Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Mathew and Boyd 2009) . Even more telling is that none of these mechanisms explains the variation in cooperation among human societies, or the massive expansion of cooperation in some societies over last 10 100 millennia (Henrich et al. 2005) .
Converging lines of field and experimental evidence suggest that cultural evolution, building on certain innate cognitive foundations, has favored the emergence of beliefs in powerful moralizing deities concerned with the prosocial behav-105 ior of individuals beyond kin-and reciprocity-based networks (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008) . Cross-cultural analysis of 186 societies has found that larger and more complex societies were much more likely to subscribe to potent deities directly concerned with morality and willing to punish norm violators 110 (Roes and Raymond 2003; Johnson 2005) . Studies conducted across a diverse range of societies including foragers, farmers, and herders, show that professing a world religion predicts greater fairness toward ephemeral interactants (Henrich et al. 2010) . Experiments with North Americans show that 115 unconsciously activating religious concepts lead to reduced cheating and greater generosity toward strangers (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Mazar and Ariely 2006; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007) , except among ardent atheists. Together, these cross-cultural, historical, and experimental findings suggest 120 that (1) religion-as a phenomenon with potentially deep roots (Klein 1989 )-has not always been about high moralizing gods and (2) modern world religions may have evolved to create a potent linkage between the supernatural and the prosocial. Thus, we hypothesize that cultural evolutionary pro-125 cesses, driven by competition among groups, have exploited aspects of our evolved psychology, including certain cognitive by-products, to gradually assemble packages of supernatural beliefs, devotions, and rituals that were increasingly effective at instilling deep commitment, galvanizing internal solidarity, 130 and sustaining larger-scale cooperation.
Ordinary Cognition Produces Extraordinary Agents
Humans are purpose-seeking, cause-inferring, story-telling animals (Gazzaniga et al. 2009 ). As Hume noted in The Natural History of Religion, the greater the impact of events on our 135 lives, the greater is our drive to impose purpose and coherence on those events. This view is backed by a recent experiment in which people were asked what patterns they could see in arrangements of dots or stock market figures (Whitson and Galinsky 2008) . Before asking, the experimenters made half 140 the participants feel a lack of control. Those who experienced a lack of control were more likely to see patterns and processes underlying the randomness, suggesting that under uncertainty Mind module(s) (ToM), which is a cognitive system devoted to making inferences about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of other minds (Baron-Cohen 1995) . Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies confirm that people's statements about God's involvement in social events, as well as 170 the deity's purported emotional states, reliably engage ToMrelated regions of the brain (Kapogiannis et al. 2009 ).
Agent concepts may be hair-trigger in our cognitive processing, allowing us to readily respond under uncertainty to potential threats by intelligent predators (Guthrie 1993) . From 175 this evolutionary vantage, agent's proper evolutionary domain encompasses animate species, but its actual domain inadvertently extends to moving dots on computer screens, voices in the wind, faces in clouds, complicated contrivances like eyes, and virtually any complex design or uncertain circum-180 stance of unknown origin (Sperber 1996) . Children and adults spontaneously interpret the contingent movements of dots and geometrical forms on a screen as interacting agents with distinct goals and internal goal-directed motivations (Heider and Simmel 1944; Bloom and Veres 1999; Csibra et al. 1999) .
185
Young children spontaneously overattribute agency to all sorts of entities (clouds, computers), and may thus be predisposed to construct agent-based representations of many phenomena (Keleman 2004) . Such reliably developing programs provide efficient reactions to a wide-but not unlimited-range 190 of stimuli that would have been statistically associated with the presence of dangerous agents in ancestral environments. Mistakes, or "false positives," would usually carry little cost, whereas a true response could provide the margin of survival. This reactive bias was likely adaptive, at least until supernat-195 ural agents were harnessed by cultural evolution to begin demanding costly actions and cooperation, under threat of divine punishment or offers of sublime rewards.
How do our minds make agent concepts into gods? Cognitive approaches propose that supernatural concepts exploit or-200 dinary mental processes to construct counterintuitive concepts (Boyer 2001; Atran 2002; Barrett 2004) . Religious beliefs are counterintuitive because they violate universal expectations about the world's mundane structure. This includes the basic categories of our "intuitive ontology" (i.e., the ontology 205 of our semantic system), such as person, animal, plant, and substance (Whythe 1993; Sperber et al. 1995) . Experimental studies reveal that children across cultures do not violate such categorical constraints in learning word meaning; for example, people cannot literally melt, and neither can animals joke, trees 210 walk, nor rocks tire (Keil 1979) . Experiments with Americans and Indians illustrate a gap between religious utterances and the mental processing of religious concepts (Barrett and Keil 1996; Barrett 1998) . When asked to describe their deities, subjects produced abstract theological descriptions of gods that 215 are able to (1) do anything, including anticipating and reacting to everything all at once, (2) know the right thing to do, and (3) dispense entirely with perceptual information and calculation. However, when asked to respond to narratives about these same gods, people interpreted their deities as being in 220 only one place at a time, puzzling over alternative actions, and looking for evidence to make a decision. In short, people mentally represent gods using our intuitive ontology, so abstract theological propositions give little insight into how people actually think about supernatural agents (Malley 2004) . Much 225 recent work suggests this intuitive ontology results from, or interacts with, certain universal modes of causal construal, including folkmechanics (object cohesion, contact, and continuity in movement), folkbiology (teleological development of species-like essences and relations), and folkpsychology 230 (intentional, goal-directed, interactive agents).
Most religious beliefs minimally violate the expectations created by our intuitive ontology and these modes of construal, thus creating cognitively manageable and memorable supernatural worlds. For example, agents that resemble us 235 emotionally, intellectually, and physically except that they can move through solid objects and live forever (angels, ghosts, and spirits) fit the bill. Table 1 provides examples of minimal violations.
Cognitive approaches hypothesize that although intuitive 240 concepts transmit well, concepts that minimally deviate from intuition transmit better, while those that deviate greatly cannot transmit successfully because they overload cognitive processes that drive inferential reasoning and relevance (Atran and Sperber 1991 . Minimally counterintuitive folktales (containing two to three supernatural events or objects) were substantially more widespread than folktales containing fewer counterintuitive elements (less than two) or those with too many counterintuitive elements (more 275 than three). In brief, counterintuitive concepts and beliefs, as long as they come in small doses, help people remember and presumably retransmit the intuitive statements, as well as the underlying knowledge that can be inferred from them. A 280 small proportion of minimally counterintuitive elements give a story a mnemonic advantage over stories with no or too many counterintuitive elements. This dual aspect of supernatural belief sets-commonsensical and counterintuitiverenders them intuitively compelling yet fantastic, eminently 285 recognizable but surprising. Cross-cultural experiments indicate that such beliefs grab attention, activate intuition, mobilize inference, and can accommodate seemingly contrary events and interpretations, in ways that facilitate their mnemonic retention, cultural transmission, and historical survival.
290

Natural Origins of Faith
The above helps explain the success of, for example, folktales and scriptures. However, this approach misses the difference between Moses' miracles and Mickey Mouse's antics (Atran 1998) . Or, why the faithfuls of one religion do not adopt be-295 liefs in the gods of other religions once they learn about them (Gervais and Henrich forthcoming). So, the question is why AQ2 do people become deeply committed to particular counterintuitive agents or stories-so committed that they would die for their beliefs?
300
We are a cultural species. Unlike other animals, humans have evolved to rely heavily on acquiring behavior, beliefs, motivations, and strategies from others in their group. These psychological processes, shaped by natural selection, focus our attention on both those domains and individuals that likely 305 to possess fitness-enhancing information (Henrich and GilWhite 2001; Richerson and Boyd 2005) . Human social learning generates vast bodies of know-how and complex practices that accumulate and improve over generations. Studies of small-scale societies show that survival and reproduction 310 are dependent on cumulative bodies of information related to hunting (animal behavior), edible plants (seasonality, toxicity, etc.), medical knowledge, technical manufacture, and so on (Liebenberg 1990; Henrich and McElreath 2003; Henrich 2008) .
315
Because of the dependence that human ancestors increasingly had to place on such complex, often nonintuitive, products of cumulative cultural evolution, natural selection may have favored a willingness to rely on culturally acquired (Beck 1992) . Such foods often contain low dosages of toxins that cause little harm for months or even years, and don't badly 325 damage the food's flavor. However, such toxins will accumulate and eventually cause severe health problems and death. A naïve learner who favors his own experience of eating the foods without the arduous processing will do less work in the short run, but possibly die in the long run. Place faith in traditional 330 practices, without understanding why, can be adaptive. Similarly, manufacturing complex technologies or medicines often involve a sequence of important steps, most of which cannot be skipped without producing an inferior outcome. Experimentation is of limited use in rearranging or dropping steps because 335 even a relatively small number of steps yield a combinatorial explosion of possible alternative procedures. Learners must have faith, and copy all steps. This suggests that a willingness to sometimes rely on faith-to believe in cultural traditions over experience or intuitions-is likely a product of evolving 340 in a world with complex cultural adaptations. Supporting evidence comes from developmental psychology, which documents a potent tendency for "over-imitation" in children, and recently demonstrated how deeply overimitation influences our acquisition and encoding of concepts 345 (Lyons et al. 2007 ). This comes across most starkly in studies comparing children and chimpanzees. When both species observe demonstrations of a task involving multiple steps, children accurately copy all steps, including steps that direct visual inspection and are unnecessary. Chimpanzees do some copy-350 ing, but skip unnecessary steps, leading them to more efficient repertoires than children (Horner and Whiten 2005) . Children implicitly assume that if the model performed a seemingly unnecessary action, it was probably important, even if they cannot understand precisely why.
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With the evolution of language, this faith in culturally transmitted information became vulnerable to exploitation by individuals-particularly successful and prestigious individuals-able to transmit practices or beliefs they themselves might not hold. Language makes exaggeration, dis-360 tortion, manipulation, and deception easy and cheap. Before language, learners observed and inferred people's underlying beliefs or desires by their behavior. Those wishing to deceive would have to actually perform an action to transmit it. To avoid being manipulated by models proficient at altering or 365 exaggerating commitments to certain beliefs, evolutionary approaches suggest that humans may have evolved cognitive abilities that examine the fit between a model's words (expressed beliefs) and actions. In figuring out who to learn from, learners consider both a model's cues of success, skill, and 370 prestige (among other cues) and whether a models' expressed beliefs are supported by diagnostic actions that permit an assessment of the model's underlying degree of commitment to their expressed beliefs. For example, if a potential model rails against prostitution, but then uses prostitutes for his own 375 clandestine recreation, a learner should de-weight this model's influence in cultural transmission with regard to prosecuting prostitution. This means that if a model's belief causes him to perform "costly displays"-that is, actions that would be too costly for someone with different beliefs to perform-learners 380 should be more willing to learn from this model. If a model is successful or prestigious in the eyes of learners, and performs costly displays cueing deep commitment to his expressed beliefs, then learners should more readily adopt and believe in (be committed to) the models' expressed beliefs (Henrich 2009). 385 Experimental findings support this. Thus, young children are generally unwilling to sample a novel food offered by a stranger as "something to eat" without first seeing the stranger eat it (Harper and Sanders 1975) . Developmental studies of the transmission of altruistic giving show that neither preaching 390 nor exhortation to charity is effective without opportunities to observe costly giving by models (Henrich and Henrich 2007) . Studies of children's beliefs about the existence of entities like intangible germs, angels, and mermaids show that children only subscribe to those agents whom adults seem to endorse 395 through their daily actions, and remain skeptical of unendorsed supernatural agents (Harris et al. 2006) . Similarly, interviews with a diverse sample of parents from highly religious Christian, Jewish, Mormon, and Muslim families reveal that parents see religion holding their children on a virtuous life course pri-400 marily because of their costly investments in "practicing (and parenting) what you preach" (Marks 2004 ).
This suggests an approach to devotions (fasting, celibacy, etc.) and rituals as having evolved culturally (at least in part) to deepen people's commitments to counterintuitive beliefs. 405 Counterintuitive beliefs have a mnemonic advantage, but not a belief advantage. Both direct experience and our own intuitions often contradict counterintuitive beliefs, and reality does not readily provide decisive evidence in their favor. (There are many potentially counterintuitive beliefs that can be em-410 pirically grounded through arduous scientific effort-think quantum teleportation, evolution, etc.-but common sense and experience doesn't favor even these beliefs.) This puts counterintuitives at a disadvantage relative to mundane or intuitive beliefs. Rituals and devotions can help overcome this disad-415 vantage through acts of costly commitment (Henrich 2009) .
In this view, costly ritual or devotional acts may have evolved as a means to convince learners of the personal commitment of either the rest of the congregation (exploiting conformist biases in our learning) or of locally prestigious models 420 (Henrich 2009 ). Rituals and devotions exploit our reliance on diagnostic actions to deepen commitment to counterintuitive beliefs. They also link performance of costly acts to (Festinger et al. 1956 ). Since many religious beliefs are logically inscrutable and immune to empirical falsification, a failed prophecy (direct evidence) may mean that more introspection and commitment is 445 needed. These lines of reasoning and evidence suggest that commitment to supernatural agents tends to spread in a population to the extent it elicits costly displays, usually in the form of ritual ceremonies, offerings, devotions, and sacrifices. When 450 community leaders and congregations demonstrate commitment to supernatural beliefs in costly rites, observers who witness these commitments are more inclined to trust and follow participants. Such trust and following often extend to wider sets of mundane beliefs and associated actions because (1) peo-455 ple tend to follow, and give the benefit of doubt to, models with proven success and commitment in one valued domain as they move into other domains (hence, advertisers get famous people to sell their wares) (Henrich and Gil-White 2001) ; and (2) many counterintuitive beliefs violate our intuitive ontology, 460 and are thus literally preposterous (like many poetic tropes); they can only be meaningfully interpreted in terms exogenous to the beliefs themselves. Consequently, religious trust and following carry over to other beliefs and actions associated with ritualized actions, including cooperative works, charity, 465 commerce, moral norms, and warfare.
Supernatural agents that incentivize costly sacrifices will tend to spread, creating an emerging linkage between degree of commitment to belief and costly displays. For example, alongside prohibitions against various social ills (e.g., murder, 470 adultery, and theft), God commanded the Israelites to keep holy the Sabbath or suffer death. Demands for rituals, devotions, and sacrifices guarantee intergenerational transmission of deep commitments (Alcorta and Sosis 2005) , as children infer deep commitment from costly actions of adults (Henrich 2009 ).
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Because the deeply committed actually believe in the agent's incentives, sacrifices and rituals needn't seem (subjectively) costly.
Religions have culturally evolved to deploy a variety of other means to ratchet up faith and commitment. Faith in 480 otherwise inscrutable content is deepened and validated by communion: collectively engaging emotions and motivations using music, rhythm, and synchrony. Of people reporting a religious experience, music is the single most important elicitor of the experience, followed by prayer and group services 485 (Greeley 1975) . Listeners as young as three years old reliably associate basic emotions-anger, sadness, fear, joy-with musical structures (Trainor and Trehub 1992) . Recent study finds that strangers acting in synchrony-marching, singing, and dancing-cooperate more in subsequent group exercises, 490 even in situations requiring personal sacrifice. Synchronous action (rhythmically moving together) increases cooperation by strengthening social bonds among group members, even when no positive emotion is attached to the movement (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009) . The ability of music, rhythm, and synchrony 495 to instill commitment and trust is also apparent why military drills and routines developed over the centuries to train soldiers and build armies (McNeil 1982) .
This indicates that groups and institutions that survive and spread will possess both costly displays (devotions and rituals) 500 of commitment and values that glorify such sacrifices for group beliefs. The Navajo, for example, are among the most successful cooperators and survivors of Native American groups, with men spending upwards of one-third, and women one-fifth, of their productive time on "priestly rites" (Kluckholn and 505 Leighton 1946) . Historical studies suggest that early Christianity spread to become the majority religion in the Roman Empire through costly displays such as martyrdom and charity (e.g., risking death by caring for sick non-Christians during epidemics; Stark 1997) . Strengthening the group through rit-510 ual participation and costly displays also applies to a variety of modern movements for civil and human rights that grow by "waging peace" in the battle for public opinion, including those modeled on the nonviolent doctrines and costly commitments (imprisonment, harassment, etc.) of Gandhi and M. L. 515 King (Smith 1996) . Martyring spiritual leaders often stimulates the spread of their ideas by providing persuasive displays of the leader's deep commitment.
Below, we sketch a cultural evolutionary process that assembles these otherwise disparate elements into a general ac-520 count of the evolution of religions.
Coevolution of Counterintuitive Beliefs and Norms for Complex Societies
Counterintuitive beliefs are readily recalled and retransmitted. Rituals and devotions involving costly displays, music, 525 rhythm, and synchrony can ratchet up the belief in, and commitment to, these counterintuitive beliefs. Now, the questions are (1) how do these elements of effective rituals and devotions get assembled and linked with particular supernatural agents?; (2) why do these supernatural agents so favor prosocial behav-530 ior, by forbidding stealing, lying, murdering, adultery, and so forth?; and (3) why does this seem more prevalent in recent and increasingly large and complex societies? A rising tide of evidence suggests that religious beliefs, rituals, devotions, and social norms have coevolved in interlocking cultural com-535 plexes in a process driven by competition among alternative complexes.
As a species we rely heavily on acquiring key aspects of our behavior by observing others. Humans readily acquire social strategies, practices, beliefs, and preferences via cul-540 tural learning in ways consistent with evolutionary predictions.
AQ3
Children acquire altruistic behaviors or other costly norms via observation and inference, and will spontaneously apply imitated standards to others, sanctioning them if necessary (Henrich and Henrich 2007; Rakoczy et al. 2008) . Game the-545 oretic analyses show that when cultural learning is combined with social interaction, a variety of different stable states (i.e., social norms or institutions) emerge. Unlike genetic transmission, this is even true in larger scale cooperative endeavors (Henrich and Boyd 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004) , in 550 which both cooperative and defecting states can remain stable. When the aforementioned cognitive mechanisms for weighting costly displays are included as part of cultural learning, belief-action combinations yield many different stable states, including those in which the actions are individually costly, 555 and potentially cooperative (Henrich 2009 ).
Existence of alternative stable sets of norms across human societies creates conditions in which competition among groups will favor the emergence of prosocial norms-that is, norms that lead to success in competition with other groups.
560
The most important norms are likely to be those that increase cooperation (e.g., in warfare and economic production) or reduce within-group conflict, by regulating sexual relationships or managing disputes. Because this process involves competition among stable states, modeling shows that it does not suffer 565 the challenges typically associated with the genetic group selection of altruism (Boyd and Richerson 2002) .
This process is capable of assembling those combinations of supernatural beliefs, rituals, and devotions that most reinforce cooperative or other prosocial norms. Religious el-570 ements can operate in at least four interrelated ways. First, observation and participation in costly rituals are likely to induce deep commitment to associated norms, leading to greater intrinsic motivation to comply (Henrich 2009 ). Second, supernatural policing and incentives (heaven vs. hell) can buttress 575 more worldly norm-sustaining mechanisms, such as punishment, signaling, and reputation (Gintis et al. 2001; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004) . By augmenting these mechanisms, supernatural beliefs have culturally selective advantages over purely secular mechanisms (Johnson 580 2005) . At the margins, the additional psychological threat of supernatural incentives reduces the costs of punishing violators, provides a threat when no human eyes are watching, and may tilt the balance in situations when the benefits of defecting (charging a vast enemy) exceed the potential worldly costs. If 585 a transgressor has faith in divine awareness and retribution, then external policing, capture, and punishment "automatically" come from within. By reenforcing worldly mechanisms where they are weak (e.g., monitoring large populations), supernatural beliefs can help extend the scale and intensity of 590 cooperation. Third, when supernatural punishment is either indiscriminate or collective, third parties have a direct incentive to keep norm violators in line. If people believe that their god will punish everyone (say, by a drought) for the misdeeds of a few (e.g., adultery), then everyone has an incentive to keep 595 everyone else in line.
The fourth way religion can galvanize prosocial norms is by making gods the authors of sacred canons or values that authenticate society-in the minds of believers-as having an existence above a mere aggregation of its individuals and 600 institutions (Durkheim 1995; Wilson 2002) . Beyond simply the authority of authorship, the ineffability of sacred "propositions" (e.g., "God is merciful to believers," or "this land is holy") effectively places them beyond logical or empirical scrutiny (Rappaport 1999) . Recent work reveals that children's 605 beliefs in God as the creator of everything favors essentializing of social categories, meaning that religious beliefs about divine creators predict the inferring that ethnic/religious category membership is stable (immutable: these effects seem limited to human categories, and do not influence judgments 610 about artifacts or animals). This suggests that competition among socioreligious groups will favor beliefs that galvanize and reify group membership by extending our intuitive system for essence-based inferences (used for thinking about biological kinds; Atran 1998) to the relevant human social categories 615 (Diesendruck and Haber 2009) . By sparking our tendency to essentialize some categories (e.g., biological species), beliefs in supernatural creators may facilitate (psychologically) the unification of diverse tribes into a single, stable, immutable people, and God's people.
620
The same evolutionary process will favor distinct markers of group members, often in the form of taboos. These emerge as nonnegotiable prohibitions about beliefs and behaviors that systematically covary with sacred (less observable) beliefs and values (Durkheim 1995; Wilson 2002 work, and trade). Together with religious rituals, devotions, and insignia, such practices can foster a cohesive group identity and increase solidarity vis-à-vis other groups. Here religion exploits and extends our "tribal psychology" that has long marked group boundaries through language, dialect, and dress 635 . For example, the Hebrew Kingdom of Judah used circumcision, dietary laws, and a prohibition against work on the Sabbath (etc.) as displays of commitment to their God. This enabled the alliance of Hebrew tribes to set themselves apart 640 from coastal peoples (e.g., Philistines, Canaanites) and forged a unification that withstood stronger invaders (e.g., Egyptians, Babylonians) (Sweeney 2001) . Violating the Sabbath, along with idolatry, were considered the gravest violations and punishable by death (Phillips 1970) . These were both costly and 645 arbitrary markers of corporate identity relative to the concrete needs of social life shared with other groups (in contrast to prohibitions on stealing, adultery, murder, etc.). Disregard of these was considered a reliable signal of sin and failure of commitment. From this perspective, groups using such costly 650 markers succeed because they (1) transmit commitment in the next generation, (2) eliminate, or identify, those lacking sufficient commitment to the group and its god(s) (Irons 1996; Sosis and Alcorta 2003) , and (3) psychologically demarcate the group in ways that engage our tendency to essentialize and 655 reify group boundaries.
Norms are often attached to powerful emotions (anger, guilt, shame) that can be amplified by certain religious beliefs into dread, awe, or anxiety. This leads to strong reactions against norm violators that range from bad-mouthing to ban-660 ishment, and from manhandling to murder. Experiments show that when norms are associated with the sacred, they become emotionally charged and less influenced by material calculations and tradeoffs (Tetlock 2003) . In conflict situations, as in the Middle East, recent research reveals that material offers 665 from one group to another proposing that norms associated with sacred values be relaxed or abandoned generate moral outrage, and increase people's readiness to support lethal violence. Such sacred values appear to be somewhat immune to the rationality of realpolitik or the marketplace, implying that 670 a "business-like" approach to negotiations in conflicts involving sacred values may backfire Ginges et al. 2007; Dehghani et al. 2009 ). From our perspective, increasing the material incentives to a believer in exchange for violating sacred values might result in substantial increasing of the sig-675 naling value obtained from rejecting the material payoffs. The target of the signal might be God, one's fellows, or one's self.
The line sketched here allows some predictions about the historical emergence of supernatural agents. Gods of increasingly complex societies should evolve to be more concerned 680 with (1) in-group cooperation (help your co-religionists), harmony (no stealing, lying, or adultery), and fair exchange, (2) sexual and family relations (increasing reproduction of new adherents), and (3) the performance of commitment-inducing rituals (Roes 1995; Roes and Raymond 2003; Johnson 2005) . 685 To better police and reward adherents, the gods of emerging complex societies need more knowledge of mortal behavior (evolution of omniscience) and more power to reward and punish (thus, an afterlife in heaven or hell). This allows gods to monitor people in ephemeral or anonymous situations, and 690 to provide potent incentives, if they can instill deep commitment. Along these lines, beliefs in an eternal, blissful afterlife for the faithful emerged likely only after 500 B.C. in Eurasia, with the rise of cosmopolitan religions such as Hinduism, Mahayana Buddhism, and Christianity (McNeil 1991).
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The Religious Rise of Civilizations
Scholars have long suspected a link between certain religious forms and the emergence of complex societies. In the 14th century, historian Ibn Khaldûn examined different waves of invasion in the Maghreb and argued that enduring dynastic 700 power stems from religious "group feeling," with its ability to unite desires, inspire hearts, and support mutual cooperation (Khaldûn 2005) . Historical work suggests that the beliefs, rituals, and norms (e.g., inheritance rules, ethnic equality, judicial procedures) of Islam spread initially by providing a means of 705 unifying the warring Arabic tribes, giving them the ability to cooperate, conquer, and gradually assimilate surrounding peoples (Levy 1957) . Contemporary studies indicate that Islam spread into Sub-Saharan Africa by drawing people into tighter religiously based networks of trust that facilitate trade and eco-710 nomic success (Ensminger 1997) . As expected, this process is galvanized by costly devotions and rituals (fasting, frequent prayer, taboos on pork and alcohol) that demarcate believers from everyone else. Similar considerations apply to the ongoing spread of evangelical Protestantism in Asia, Africa, and 715 Latin America (Freston 2001) .
The archaeological record reveals a clear, coevolutionary connection between religion, ritual, and complex societies. Recent finds indicate that rituals became much more formal, elaborate, and costly as societies developed from for-720 aging bands into chiefdoms and states (Marcus and Flannery 2004; cf Whitehouse 2004) . In Mexico before 4000 B.P., for example, nomadic bands relied on informal, unscheduled, and inclusive rituals. The same goes for contemporary foragers, such as the San of Africa's Kalahari desert, whose ad-hoc rit-725 uals (e.g., trance dancing) include all community members, and are organized according to the contingencies of rainfall, hunting, and illnesses (Lee 1979) .
Then, with the establishment of permanent villages and multi-village chiefdoms (4000-3000 B.P.), rituals are man-730 aged by social achievers (prestigious "Big Men" and chiefs)
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and scheduled by solar and astral events. This also appears to be the case for pre-dynastic Egypt (6000-5000 B.P.) and China (4500-3500 B.P.), as well as for North American chiefdoms. After the state was formed in Mexico (2500 B.P.), important 735 rituals were performed by a class of full-time priests, subsidized by society, using religious calendars and occupying temples built at enormous costs in labor and lives. This is also true for the earliest state-level societies of Mesopotamia (after 5500 B.P.) and India (after 4500 B.P.), which, as in Mesoamer-740 ican, practiced fearsome human sacrifice (Campbell 1974) . Combining this with comparative ethnography suggests that high moralizing gods likely coevolved with costly regularized rituals, creating a mutually reenforcing cultural nexus capable of enhancing internal cooperation and harmony, while provid-745 ing a justification to exploit out-groups. Combining these observations with recent work in psychology illuminates a linkage between monumental architecture and religion. The earliest civilizations are known for their impressive monuments, usually in the form of temples, pyra-750 mids (tombs), and ziggurats (altars) that may have served at least two important psychological purposes: (1) as costly displays of commitment from the society's leaders, or society in general, they help to instill deeper commitments to religious/group ideologies in learners; and (2) as "religious 755 primes," their visibility may stimulate prosocial behavior. As noted, experiments show that believers give more money to others and cheat less when primed with religious concepts; a giant temple in the market square may provide a salient cue that evokes, if only at the margins, more prosocial behavior.
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Societies that better exploit these aspects of our psychology could outcompete others.
Cultural Group Selection
Our species' heavy reliance on social learning spontaneously gives rise to norms and informal institutions (stable equilib-765 ria), which vary in their group-level competitive properties. Ecological and social pressures, especially with the spread of agriculture, favor norms and institutions that strengthen and extend the social spheres of cooperation and trust while sustaining internal harmony. Deep commitments to certain kinds 770 of religious beliefs and practices can cement both adherence to prosocial norms and a willingness to sanction norm violators, thereby increasing group solidarity and competitiveness with other groups. Religious beliefs and practices, like groupbeneficial norms, can spread by competition among social 775 groups in several ways, including warfare, economic production, and demographic expansion. Such cultural representations can also spread through more benign interactions, as when members of one group preferentially acquire behaviors, beliefs, and values from more successful groups.
780
These processes of cultural group selection have both theoretical and empirical grounding. Theoretically, findings from a growing literature of formal models of cultural evolution illuminate three important facts. First, nothing in the modeling of these processes requires "essentializing" culture, nor do these 785 models assume away variation within groups. These models permit within-group variation, and show that cultural group selection can operate even in the face of ample within-group variation (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Henrich 2004; . Second, no assumptions about discrete or high fi-790 delity replication are required in models of cultural evolution, and assuming that strong cognitive attractor exists do not obviate the importance of other selective processes (Henrich and Boyd 2002; Henrich et al. 2008) . Third, important concerns AQ4 about older models involving the genetic group selection of 795 altruism do not apply to these cultural evolutionary models. There are several reasons for this but three important ones revolve around: (1) the non-vertical nature of cultural inheritance (Henrich and Boyd 2001) , (2) the speed of cultural adaptation (Boyd et al. n.d.) , and (3) presence of multiple stable equilibria 800 (Henrich 2004) .
Empirically, both detailed ethnographic studies and historical analyses support the importance of cultural group selection (see Henrich 2009 for additional cases). Ethnographically, to illustrate cultural group selection both via the 805 emulation of more prestigious groups and direct economic competition, consider the well-documented case of three adjoining populations: the Itza' Maya of Guatemala's Petén lowlands, Spanish-speaking Ladino immigrants from diverse regions, and Q'eqchi Maya who arrived in clusters of families 810 and neighbors from the highlands . Among the Itza' Maya, one important predictor of sustainability is their consensus on supernatural (as opposed to human) forest preferences. This cultural consensus about which species are most valuable and worthy of protection accords well with 815 the anthropogenic character of the forest in the Classic era of Maya civilization. The researchers' hypothesis is that spirit preferences represent a summary of experience accumulated over generations. Itza' Maya believe spirits to be "guardians" of the forest. Spirits help people who do not harm the survival 820 prospects of certain species (as spirits see those prospects). Hurting the forest can result in accidents, illness, and worse (punishment). This research team has witnessed Itza', bitten by deadly pit vipers, refuse to be taken for anticoagulant treatment, until they venture into the forest to ask spirits 825 for guidance or forgiveness. It matters little if supernatural threats are real or not: if people believe in them, threats of punishment become real deterrents (Durkheim 1995) .
Evidence indicates that much of this knowledge is being transmitted to Ladinos. Experimental elicitations show that 830 Itza' knowledge predicts relative success in short-and longterm agroforestry. By attending to Itza' models of behavioral success in agroforestry, and to Itza' stories that embed that behavior in context, prestigious Ladinos have managed to acquire P1: QPU (Sosis and Bressler 2003) . In contrast to Ladinos, migrant Q'eqchi, who have strong and highly ritualized religious institutions, pay little heed to Itza'. The Q'eqchi retain allegiances only to the spirits of 845 their native highlands and have no knowledge of Itza' beliefs. Q'eqchi send delegations back to the highlands to consult deities when they have agricultural troubles in the lowlands. Q'eqchi's mental models of the forest are correspondingly poor, as are their associated agroforestry practices, which are 850 commercially oriented and unsustainable.
These divergent beliefs mean that the Q'eqchi are now spreading more rapidly than the other two groups. In fact, Q'eqchi practices are well adapted to present "open-commons" conditions in Guatemala that encourage massive immigration 855 from the overcrowded highlands into the ecologically fragile lowlands. There is little incentive to avoid destructive practices: if one part of the forest is destroyed, Q'eqchi simply migrate. In this context, Itza' practices are currently maladaptive. By making costly commitments to preserve the forest, Itza' 860 make it easier for the highly ritualized, corporately disciplined Q'eqchi to exploit it. Thus, Itza' may be subsidizing their own cultural extinction in the competition among ethnic groups.
Historically, the impact of the cultural group selection on the interrelationship between religious beliefs and costly 865 rituals/devotions is apparent in a study of 83 utopian communes in the 19th century (Sosis and Bressler 2003) . Religious groups with more costly rituals were more likely to survive over time than religious groups with fewer costly rituals. Differential group survival yielded an increase in the mean 870 number of costly rituals per group over time. The above theory and evidence suggest that such rituals and devotions likely generated greater commitment and solidarity within groups (Henrich 2009 ). Indeed, members and leaders explicitly acknowledged that costly demands increased members' religious 875 commitment (Sosis and Bressler 2003) .
The relation of rituals to prosocial behavior toward ingroup members is demonstrated in a variety of ways. Among Israeli kibbutzim (cooperatives), individuals from religious kibbutzim cooperated more in behavioral experiments than 880 those from nonreligious ones, with increased cooperativeness of religious members attributed to greater ritual participation (Ruffle and Sosis 2006) . Religious kibbutzim also economically outperform secular ones (Fishman and Goldschmidt 1990; Ruffle and Sosis 2006) . Surveys of Palestinians and Is-885 raeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza reveal that a person's frequency of attendance at religious services predicts support for martyrdom missions. This relation is independent of time spent in prayer. Similar findings emerge for representative samples of religious Indians, Russians, Mexicans, British, and 890 Indonesians: Greater ritual attendance predicts both declared willingness to die for one's deities, and belief that other religions are responsible for problems in the world ). Finally, a study of 60 small-scale societies reveals that males from groups in the most competitive socioecologies 895 (with frequent warfare) endure the costliest rites (genital mutilation, scarification, etc.), which "ritually signal commitment and promote solidarity among males who must organize for warfare" (Sosis et al. 2007) .
Cultural group selection shapes religious beliefs and rites 900 to manipulate our psychology to increase solidarity and commitment. Such patterns, observed across history and in the anthropological record, reemerge in today's terrorist groups (Atran 2003) . Even avowedly secular national and transnational movements retain many agentive (anthropomorphic) and 905 transcendental (sacred) aspects of traditional religions (Anderson 1991): nations ritually mourn, rejoice, and demand sacrifice, and the "naturalness" of causes that defy prior human history (universal justice, equality, and liberty) is anything but empirically or logically self-evident (Atran 2010) . As 910 we argue that sociopolitical complexity coevolved with both commitment-inducing rituals and beliefs in high moralizing gods, our efforts also dovetail with recent work indicating that cultural group selection, driven by differences in sociopolitical complexity, is crucial to understanding the global distribution 915 and diversity of languages (Currie and Mace 2009) .
In sum, religion, as an interwoven complex of rituals, beliefs, and norms, plausibly arises from a combination of (1) the mnemonic power of counterintuitive representations, (2) our evolved willingness to put faith on culturally acquired beliefs 920 rooted in the commitment-inducing power of devotions and rituals, and (3) the selective effect on particular cultural complexes created by competition among societies and institutions. None of these evolved for religion per se. The mnemonic power of minimally counterintuitive representations appears to be a 925 by-product of our evolved expectations about how the world works and our fitness-enhancing requirement to pay attention to anomalies. The faith we sometimes place in culture over our own experience and intuitions is a cognitive adaptation, resulting from our long dependence on vast bodies of complex 930 cultural knowledge. Reliance on costly displays evolved to provide partial immunity against manipulation. The power of rhythm and synchrony in ritual to build solidarity (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009) likely arises from our imitative and ToM abilities. Cultural evolution, driven by competition among groups, 935 exploits each of these cognitive processes to fashion sets of counterintuitive beliefs, rituals, and norms that spread by intergroup transmission, conquest, or reproductive differentials. actions that expand the sphere of cooperation, galvanize solidarity in response to external threats, deepen faith, and sustain internal harmony. Significant advances in the study of religious cognition, the transmission of culture, and the evolution of cooperation 945 are all relatively recent. Bringing these new insights, in combination with older ideas, to bear on phenomena as complex as moralizing religions and large-scale societies will be an ongoing challenge. The argument and evidence presented here provides a plausible scenario showing how synthetic progress 950 is possible. More rigorous study is needed on the evolved psychology and cultural processes associated with the role of counterintuitive agents and costly rituals in scaling up the scope of trust and exchange of sacred values and taboos in sustaining large-scale cooperation against external threats, and 955 also of maintaining social and political causes that defy selfinterest. Empirical research that combines in-depth ethnography with both cognitive and behavior experiments among diverse societies, including those lacking a world religion, is crucial to understanding how religion influences our cogni-960 tion, decision-making, and judgments. The formal modeling of cultural evolutionary processes should be combined with historical and archeological efforts to apply these emerging insights to broad patterns of history. These joint efforts should further illuminate the origins and development of religions, 965 and the cooperation and conflicts they engender. There may be no more urgent study needed in the world today.
